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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Eugene Meyers, appeals from a judgment and sentence entered against him in the Third
Judicial District Court convicting him of forgery.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried and convicted of forgery on December 22, 1971. On January 4, 1972, Judge Joseph G.
Jeppson committed appellant to the Utah State Prison
to serve a sentence of one to twenty years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the lower court's
decision.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was charged with forging a check on the
o.ccoun t cf Royal Bell. Trial was held on December 16
'
1971, December 17, 1971, E'.nd then was continued upon
the motion of appellant until December 22, 1971 (R. 59,
60) . Appellant who was free on bail throughout the course
of the proceeding, was present the first two days of trial
but failed to appear on December 22, 1971 (R. 68). The
court ::tllowed the trial to be delayed while efforts were
made to find appellant and bring him to trial (R. 66 and
72) . When those efforts proved unsuccessful, the state's
motion to proceed with the trial was granted over the
objection of appellant's counsel. Counsel for appellant
then informed the court that he had no witnesses to call
but stated that he would not rest his case and that the
court would have to rest for him (R. 66-67). The court
responded by requiring the defense to rest and final argu·
ments were heard (R. 67). The jury returned a verdict
of guilty (R. 71) and sentencing was held on January 4,
1972.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT BELO'V DID NOT ERR IN
CONTINUING THE TRIAL IN DEFENDANT'S ABSENCE, AS VOLUNTARY ABSENCE CONSTITUTES A WAIVER OF THE
RIGHT TO I3E PRESENT.

I

I

I

'.}

u

Respondent contends that appellant's voluntary absence from the final day of his trial constituted a waiver
/ of his right to be present and he cannot now complain.

I

Appellant cites Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574, 4 S. Ct.
202 (1884), as authority for the proposition that a defendant cannot waive his right to be present at trial by his
voluntary absence. Although that may be true for cases
involving capital offenses, as was Hopt, supra, it is not
true of noncapital cases. Capital cases are in a class by
themselves. Furthermore, the defendant in Hopt v. Utah,
supra, was not free on bail but was held in custody and
his absence from trial was not voluntary.
Appellant also cites State v. Mannion, 19 Utah 505,
57 P. 542 (1899), as authority for the notion that the
right to be present may not be voluntarily waived. That,
however, was not the issue in Mannion, supra. In that
case, the defendant did not voluntarily waive his right
to be present, but was removed by court order.
The general rule in both the state and federal courts
is set forth in Diaz v. United States, 223 U. S. 442, 32 S.
Ct. 250 ( 1911) . The defendant in that case was on trial
for homicide, a noncapital offense, and was free on bail.
Twice during the trial, the defendant voluntarily absented
himself from the proceeding. He later claimed on appeal
that the continuing of the trial in his absence constituted
a violation of his constitutional rights. In affirming his
conviction, the Supreme Court stated:
"But, where the offense is not capital and the
accused is not in custody, the prevailing rule has
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been, tho..t if, after the trial has begun in his presence, he voluntarily absents himself, this does not
nullify what has been done or prevent the completion of the trial, but on the contrary, operates
as a waiver of his right to be present, and leaves
the court free to proceed with the trial in like
manner and with like effect as if he were present."
Id. at 254.
The case of State v. Aikers, 87 Utah 507, 51 P. 2d
1052 (1935), makes it clear that Utah follows the general
rule. It should be noted that Aikers, supra, was decided
after both Hopt, supra, and Mannion, supra, cited by
appellant. In that case, the defendant, Aikers, was free
on bail and failed to learn of the commencing of his trial.
Consequently, he missed the first morning of the trial
and claimed on appeal that he had, thereby, been denied
his constitutional right to be present. In upholding his
conviction for robbery, the Utah Supreme Court said:
" ... The defendant may, by conduct or words
waive such right and that he may not take advantage of his voluntary absence, if he is at liberty
on bail, during some part of the proceedings at
which it is his duty as well as his right to be in
attendance." Id. at 1055.
Defendant was found to have voluntarily waived the right
to be present, guaranteed not only by the state and federal constitutions, but also by a state statute.
The general rule set forth in Diaz, supra, and Aikers,
supra, is so well established that it has been adopted as
part of Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proced-
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nee. The second sentence of that rule reads as follows:
"In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the
defendant's volw1tary absence after the trial has been
commenced in his presence shall not prevent continuing
the trial to and including the return of the verdict." 18
U.S. C. A. Rule 43.
A note tD that rule makes it clear that the rule did
not mal;:e new law, but was merely a restatement of the
already existing law in that area. Id. at 308, note 2.
An examination of the case law of the various states
thmughout the country makes it clear that the general
rule ex1Hessed in Diaz, supra, and Aikers, supra, is also
adopted by the vast majority of state courts. The following are but a few recent examples of such decisions: State
v. Tacon, 488 P. 2d 973, 197 Ariz. 353 (1971); Hanley v.
State, 434 P. 2d 440, 83 Nev. 461 (1967); McKinney v.
Com., 474 S. W. 2d 384 (Ky. 1971); Com. v. Flemmi, 277
N. E. 2d 523 (Mass. 1971); State v. Stockton, 185 S. E.
2d 459 (N. C. 1971); People v. Teitelbaum, 329 P. 2d 157
(Cal. 1957); Wilson v. State, 90 S. E. 2d 557 (Ga. 1955);
State v. Utecht, 36 N. W. 2d 126 (Minn. 1949); Com. v.
Dwhl, 107 A. 2d 543 (Pa. 1954).
CONCLUSION
Appellant was present at the first two days of his
trial and was also present when the trial was ordered continued, at his request, until the following week. He was
free on bail but voluntarily failed to appear on the continued date. Respondent respectfully submits, therefore,
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that appellant, by his conduct, waived his right to be present and cannot now complain. Appellant violated a legal
duty by failing to appear at his trial. The granting of the
relief which he seeks on appeal would allow him to profit
by his own misconduct. Neither the law nor justice provide for such a result.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

